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FEDERALIST No. 39
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles For the Independent
Journal.
MADISON To the People of the State of New York:
THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce
a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we
now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. The first
question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of
the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form
would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the
fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination
which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments
on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention,
therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates
must abandon it as no longer defensible. What, then, are the distinctive
characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be
sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term
by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory
one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority
is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination
of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute
power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute
manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture
of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified
with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican
branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has,
with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics.
These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine
republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used
in political disquisitions. If we resort for a criterion to the different
principles on which different forms of government are established, we may
define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body
of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL
to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society,
not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise
a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation
of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for
their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for
such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either
directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments
by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in
the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been
or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican
character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some
or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by
the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is
so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended
to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all
the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended
to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative
and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions
of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable
and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department
are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior. On comparing
the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed,
we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to
it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all
the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the
people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland,
derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly
derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most
of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will,
as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the
people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable
to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The
House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States;
and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The
Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year
more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that
of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in
office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief
magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years.
In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however,
no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate.
And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office.
The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his
continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their
places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The
tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal
regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the
State constitutions. Could any further proof be required of the republican
complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its
absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and
the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form
to each of the latter. ``But it was not sufficient,'' say the adversaries
of the proposed Constitution, ``for the convention to adhere to the republican
form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form,
which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of
which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union
as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.'' And it is asked by what authority this
bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made
of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection
is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first,
to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly,
to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government;
and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any
defect of regular authority. First. In order to ascertain the real character
of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on
which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers
are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them;
and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be
introduced. On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that
the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the
people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but,
on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people,
not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct
and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the
assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme
authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act,
therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a
FEDERAL act. That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these
terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming
so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious
from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision
of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of
the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States
that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent
than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that
of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction
as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of
the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority
in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must
be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering
the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority
of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted.
Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign
body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established,
be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution. The next relation is, to
the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived.
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and
on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State.
So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other
hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal
societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in
the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government
is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very
compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made
by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them
are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal
societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual
election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which
consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they
are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many
distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government
it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL
as NATIONAL features. The difference between a federal and national government,
as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist
in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies
composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter,
on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities.
On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL,
not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been
understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies
to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against
in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national
countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a
few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan;
and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual
capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the
whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government. But if the
government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes
its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its
powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority
over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons
and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people
consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the
national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes,
it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures.
In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme;
and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the
latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent
portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres,
to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them,
within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government
cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies
relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which
is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government.
But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to
be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all
the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality.
Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword
and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under
the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more
properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is
a position not likely to be combated. If we try the Constitution by its
last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find
it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national,
the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the
people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times,
like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish
its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand,
the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every
alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan
of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring
more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority,
and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS,
it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character;
in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient,
it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character. The
proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation
it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers
of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national;
in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent
of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative
mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly
national. PUBLIUS.
FEDERALIST No. 40
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
From the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788.
MADISON To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized
to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention
ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions
given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these,
however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at
Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787,
it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis
recommends the ``appointment of commissioners to take into consideration
the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as
shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal
government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such
an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as
when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of
every State, will effectually provide for the same. ''The recommendatory
act of Congress is in the words following:``WHEREAS, There is provision
in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations
therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures
of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there
are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several
of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions
to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes
expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to
be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT:``Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient,
that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall
have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for
the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS
AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed
by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES
OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. ''From these two acts,
it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in
these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was
to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE
PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected
by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is
expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD
APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis;
4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress,
and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed
by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several
modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention
acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES
OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation
into such form as to accomplish these purposes. There are two rules of
construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms.
The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be
allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other
is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important
should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed
to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions
defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance
with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly,
in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS
in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to
have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which
the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous
expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against
those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare,
whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America,
that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate
government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government
should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them
declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing
which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or
whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness,
was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to
which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is
it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable
to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES OF THE
CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government;
into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress,
it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that
could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the
body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein
are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title;
to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted
that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain?
Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary
between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change
which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and
that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said
that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation?
The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity,
nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform
had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and
ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they
require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should
be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded
by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government
should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people
of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these
legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY
ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States1 are actually
so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should
act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances,
as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States
in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing
government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy;
of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the
Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above
all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which
death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a
civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate
immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these
fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied
without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself
authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power
of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately
from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an
acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of
the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general
government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general
revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent
with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State
but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress
as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in
fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited,
and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of
their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government,
as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in
all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and
independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the
Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely
new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles
of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that
these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges
of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree
of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation
of the old. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed
from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring
the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported
a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into
effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection,
though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications
which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have
proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting
the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth;
from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth
of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice
of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example
still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt
for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection,
therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the
powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The
THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising
out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority.
In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed
and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been
real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United
States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that
supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory
and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood
by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed
a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on
which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those
to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point
of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety
of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which
the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that
they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led
their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment
for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced;
that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform
as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of
their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations
of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned
with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had
every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds
and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity
of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment,
the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia),
towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to
and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies
from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great
and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified
by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of
the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions
by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted,
in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent
than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected,
that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give
way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would
render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the
people to ``abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness,''2 since it is impossible
for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards
their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted
by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic
and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected
that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the
people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first
united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient
government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating
their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED
in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they
are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed
scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except
in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity
to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the
plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES,
the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever;
its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might
even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed,
their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still
more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their
commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation
at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. Had
the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these
considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country,
by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing
out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken
the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing
substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country
to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the
man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in
his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced
by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen,
on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose
propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what
sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER
of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their
constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body,
equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in
particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized
interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext,
it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized
by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution
for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that
reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be
lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble
example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends?
The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM
WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD. The sum of what has
been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention
of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors,
has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers,
they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants
of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise
the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both
their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought
nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views
and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to
the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS. Connecticut
and Rhode Island. Declaration of Independence.
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11-12 ] [ papers 13-14 ] [ papers 15-16 ] [ papers
17-18 ] [ papers 19-20 ]
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23-24 ] [ papers 25-26 ] [ papers 27-28 ] [ papers
29-30 ] [ papers 31-32 ]
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53-54 ] [ papers 55-56 ]
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59-60 ] [ papers 61-62 ] [ papers 63-64 ] [ papers
65-66 ] [ papers 67-68 ]
[ papers 69-70 ] [ papers
71-72 ] [ papers 73-74 ] [ papers 75-76 ] [ papers
77-78 ] [ papers 79-80 ]
[ papers 81-82 ] [ papers
83-84 ] [ paper 85 ]
